Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and Domestic Credit by Reinhart, Carmen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate
Flexibility, and Domestic Credit
Carmen Reinhart
Harvard University
January 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51263/
MPRA Paper No. 51263, posted 7. November 2013 03:16 UTC
  
 
 
 
January 24, 2012. 
 
 
Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and Domestic Credit* 
 
Nicolas E. Magud 
IMF 
Carmen M. Reinhart 
Harvard University  
Esteban R. Vesperoni 
IMF 
Abstract 
 
Protracted expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries have renewed the debate 
over policy options to cope with large capital inflows that drive credit expansions in 
emerging economies. In a forthcoming paper, we show that during capital inflow bonanzas 
credit grows more rapidly and its composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with less 
flexible exchange rate regimes. Hence, carefully crafted macro-prudential measures may 
complement macroeconomic policies. 
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*This note was published in VoxEU January 24, 2012. The longer version of the paper is 
forthcoming in Review of Development Economics.  
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Context 
 
Capital inflows bonanzas have become more frequent after restrictions to 
international movements were relaxed worldwide over the last decades.1 Capital flows to 
emerging economies can finance investment and foster economic growth, as well as increase 
welfare by facilitating consumption smoothing. However, inflows may also induce sharp 
monetary and credit expansions, which build vulnerabilities associated with currency 
mismatches and distorted asset prices.2 These vulnerabilities are usually at the core of 
currency and financial crises, especially in the context of capital flows reversals.3 
Capital inflows associated with expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries 
have typically had spillovers to emerging economies, which may be stronger this time 
around. This could be associated with: (i) more protracted policies in advanced economies (a 
push factor), and (ii) the fact that emerging 
markets have been conspicuously resilient 
during the last financial crisis, increasing 
investors’ appetite for the asset class (a pull 
factor).4 The debate over the right policy mix to 
cope with capital flows has been extensive. 
However, it has overlooked the role played by 
the exchange rate regime.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), and references therein. 
2 See Magud et al (2011) describing the four fears to capital inflows. 
3 See Eyzaguirre et al (2011) for a recent debate on capital flows reversals. 
4 The capital flows reversal was mild and relatively short-lived if compared to previous financial crises. 
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The exchange rate regime could be an important element in credit expansions for 
several reasons. First, by definition currency pegs limit the policy instruments to curve 
monetary expansions associated with large capital inflows. Second, by extending implicit 
improperly priced guarantees, fixed exchange regimes may contribute to stronger credit 
growth than flexible ones, especially in the context of large capital inflows. Montiel and 
Reinhart (2001) argue that deposit guarantees and a peg are perceived as a guarantee to 
foreign currency claims. The latter, in turn, increases the scope for banks’ expansion through 
external funds, which can potentially feed into domestic credit (i.e., an increase in the 
banking system leverage ratio). Finally, in a different context, Backé and Wójcik (2007) 
develop a simple framework with an increasing trend in productivity growth in an emerging 
economy that pegs its domestic currency to a developed economy with constant productivity 
growth.5 The peg gives place to lower interest rates and higher domestic credit compared to 
the equilibrium with a flexible regime. 
A credible fixed exchange rate regime may also place incentives for taking on debt in 
foreign currency. As for creditors, the increase in banks’ leverage—loan to deposit ratios—
that large capital inflows usually bring about can place incentives to lend directly in foreign 
currency, as this would allow banks to avoid currency mismatches in their balance sheets. As 
for debtors—in credible pegs—a small differential between interest rates in domestic and 
foreign currency may create incentives to borrow in the latter, as they would deflate a lower 
interest rate by expected domestic inflation or wage growth. These incentives have typically 
                                                 
5 This is particularly relevant in Emerging Europe. 
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played a critical role during inflation stabilization programs, especially when they were 
coupled with policies allowing liability dollarization. 
Results 
Against this backdrop, in a forthcoming paper we show that during capital inflows 
booms credit grows more rapidly and its composition tilts to foreign currency in economies 
with relatively inflexible exchange rate regimes. We build a panel of 25 emerging markets—
in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.6 Then, we define homogeneous periods of capital 
inflows booms based on either changes in trend or positive cyclical deviations from trend—
so that the observations in the panel are comparable. As a result, we identify capital inflows 
bonanzas during 1990-1997 in Asia, 1993-2002 in Latin America, and 1999-2008 in 
Emerging Europe. 
Panel regressions focus on three variables, i.e., domestic credit to the private sector (as 
percent of GDP), the share of foreign currency credit over the total, and the external financial 
and capital account (as percent of GDP). The main explanatory variable is the de-facto 
exchange rate regime in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). For robustness, we used alternative 
variations of this classification (the “coarse” and the “fine” ones), as well as IMF’s 
AREARS. In all cases the results were consistent. Given the time-varying nature of exchange 
rate regimes, using de-facto exchange rate arrangements have the advantage of drawing a 
distinction between what countries declare as their official de jure regime and their actual de 
                                                 
6 The countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Serbia, 
Turkey, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
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facto exchange rate practices, which may even capture to a certain degree the endogeneity of 
policies, shocks, and markets reactions. 
 
Then, we document that (see Figure 1 and Table 1): 7 
• Domestic credit is higher in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes.  
• The share of foreign currency credit is larger in economies with less flexible 
exchange regimes. Lack of exchange rate flexibility exacerbates the effect of large 
capital inflows (as per banking system leverage) on the composition of domestic 
credit, increasing the share of foreign currency credit.  
• There is no compelling evidence of a relationship between the ratio of capital flows to 
GDP and the exchange rate regime; i.e., when it rains, it rains everywhere. 
 
                                                 
7 See the paper for details. Notice that our empirical methodology is based on ex-post information, i.e., is 
backward-looking. An alternative approach could be to conduct event studies to capture market reactions on an 
ex-ante basis. Event studies could focus on authorities’ announcements (signals), and analyze how forward-
looking agents react to these announcements. 
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FIGURE 1 
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TABLE 1 
 
Policy Implications 
Our findings suggest that the flexibility of the exchange rate regime should be an important 
element in conceiving the policy mix to cope with large capital inflows and domestic credit 
expansions.8 Given that the exchange regime has an impact on both the amount and 
composition of domestic private credit, there is room for macro-prudential regulations. These 
may counteract the lack of exchange rate flexibility by curving credit growth and reducing 
the share of foreign currency loans. In particular, the following regulations may target banks’ 
external funding and incentives to lend/borrow in foreign currency: 
• Currency-dependent liquidity requirements—maybe even combining them with 
marginal reserve requirements on external wholesale financing. Both contain credit 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Ostry et al (2010) for a recent debate on these issues. 
Domestic Credit Share of FX Credit Capital inflows
Exchange rate regime 1/ (-) (-)
Capital inflows (+) (+)
Broad money (+)
Share of domestic deposits in FX (+)
Interest rate diffferential (+)
Leverage (+)
Leverage*exchange rate regime (-)
Financial integration (+)
Trade openness (+)
External debt (+)
1/ This variable decreases as the exchange rate regime becomes more rigid.
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and reduce incentives to borrow in foreign currency by reducing the interest rate 
differential between loans in domestic and foreign currency.9  
• Increasing capital requirement for FX loans and/or introducing dynamic provisioning 
on FX loans (i.e. provisions increase as the share of FX loan over the total increases). 
These would place incentives for banks to internalize the higher credit risk associated 
with potential borrowers’ currency mismatches. They would also facilitate the 
building of buffers to cope with capital flows reversals. 
• Tightening debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios (conditional on the debts’ 
currency denomination) would also contribute to contain domestic credit directly, and 
might be more effective than traditional monetary tightening—i.e. increasing 
domestic interest rates. 
Advanced Economies 
While our analysis focuses on emerging economies, a snapshot on advanced economies 
suggests that exchange rate flexibility may also play a role on credit expansions. Figure 
2below suggests that capital inflows may have also been associated with credit expansions in 
the euro zone since the mid-1990s. On the other hand, albeit with less significant capital 
inflows (in terms of their gross domestic product), countries with more flexible exchange 
regimes do not show a positive association between capital inflows and domestic credit 
expansions. While preliminary, this evidence suggests that it might be worth looking at the 
                                                 
9 Notice that imposing reserve requirements across the board will not affect on interest rate differentials. 
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dynamics of exchange rate flexibility, capital inflows and domestic credit in advanced 
economies as well.   
FIGURE 2 
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